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In December 2018, the Euro Summit agreed a term sheet on how to reform the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). In June this year, the summit is due to endorse concrete changes to 
the ESM treaty. The debate on reforming the ESM was triggered for a rather narrow reason: the 
necessity to re-open the ESM treaty to include a backstop function for the Single Resolution 
Fund to finally make headway towards completing banking union.  
But once the debate had started, ambition became plentiful in particular in some member states 
to attach to the backstop a comprehensive reform of the ESM: a new “European Monetary Fund” 
would finally make Europe independent of US influence in the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). By addressing the main remaining gaps, the reform would turn the arrangements quickly 
built during the crisis into a more stable and sustainable crisis-management architecture.  
Before diving into the matter, one point of clarification is necessary: We often have a potential 
crisis in Italy in mind when we discuss Eurozone crisis management and possible reforms 
thereof. But looking at the sheer size of the Italian economy and of its outstanding debt, it seems 
unlikely that the ESM – neither in its current nor after any of the possible reforms – with its 
large, yet limited, volume would be the weapon of choice in such a crisis. Arguably, in such a 
situation the ECB would be the only institution with the necessary resources. 
So when we talk about ESM reform, Italy is not the scenario we should have in mind. Instead, 
there are two central scenarios for which the ESM was built and which should be the benchmark 
for judging any potential reform paths to ESM: First, a small- or medium-sized member state 
loses market access on its own. Second, one or several of these member states are an innocent 
bystander affected by contagion coming from another member state.  
As argued before, ESM reform is not a silver bullet that can solve all the problems of the 
Eurozone. Yet the backstop has opened a window of opportunity to substantially improve the 
Eurozone’s capacity to resolve crises in the future. As I will argue in this policy brief, this 
opportunity is very likely to be missed – indeed the planned reform might make matters worse in 
some areas. There are five main reasons for this: 
1. As unanimity remains the main decision-making mode, the reform does not change the 
fact that crisis-management remains highly dependent on the political mood in member 
state capitals. 
2. The reform does not remedy the problem that contagion coming from large member 
states is hard to contain under the current decision-making procedures. 
3. The reform effectively removes precautionary lending from the ESM toolbox. 
4. The reform does not clarify how the Eurozone plans to deal with unsustainable public 
debt in the future. 
5. The reform charges ESM staff with new tasks but does not change its internal structure 
and accountability channels accordingly. 
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1 Reason One: Unanimity remains untouched 
During the Eurozone crisis, it was not the sophistication of its institutional setup that kept the 
Eurozone together. Rather, two factors mattered: First, the ECB proved to be inventive and acted 
forcefully. But second, and even more important, in the end all member states had the political 
will to keep the euro alive. Governments and political parties in a large number of member states 
on both sides of the north-south divide paid a substantial political price for this. But it worked.  
The problem now is: The whole architecture still depends on this political will remaining in place 
during the next crisis. But we have no guarantee that this will be the case. All major ESM 
decisions still require unanimity – in particular any decision to grant financial assistance. A 
number of countries also need the approval of their national parliaments before they can vote in 
favour. And while there is an emergency procedure reducing the majority threshold to 85% if the 
European Commission and the ECB attest an immediate danger, it is unclear whether politically 
this can ever be used except in cases of openly obstructionist governments. In any case, even at 
85%, the three largest member states still have a veto (see also reason two below).   
This is in stark contrast with the IMF, where no Executive Board member from any EU member 
state ever asks a national parliament for its assent before voting in favour of a programme – and 
where no EU member state has a veto despite all of them incurring a financial risk every time the 
Fund lends money.  
The reliance on unanimity leaves Eurozone stability vulnerable to the political mood in each and 
every member state – and markets know this, which increases the probability of a multiple-
equilibria crisis. The political environment at the beginning of the 2010s was materially different 
in terms of the strength of Eurosceptic parties compared to the set of parties and governments 
with which we will enter the 2020s – and even in mainstream parties in a lot of northern 
member states there is widespread Eurozone fatigue. Therefore, it is far from guaranteed that in 
each and every situation all member states will always be on board.    
The planned ESM reform could have changed this by introducing qualified majority voting for 
programme decisions. Clearly, this was politically not on the cards and at least in Germany 
ending the veto could lead to constitutional problems. Yet, whatever the reason behind it, the 
lack of governance reform means that the ESM remains an institution that cannot move an inch 
without unanimity – and that could be a major problem in future. 
2 Reason Two: Contagion from large countries remains 
hard to contain 
Sticking to unanimity is usually discussed in the context of possible veto by reluctant “creditor” 
countries. But there is another context in which the veto takes on a wholly different meaning: 
Should a large member state decide to play uncooperatively e.g. by openly defying the fiscal 
rules, this could have contagion effects on other member states. Shoring up the rest of the 
Eurozone – and in particular small and vulnerable member states – against this contagion via 
ESM instruments such as precautionary credit lines could be necessary. 
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However, the ESM could not be used to protect other countries against contagion from a large 
member state’s behaviour without that member state’s consent as in the case of France, Germany 
or Italy the emergency procedure outlined above does not apply due to their veto power. It seems 
very unlikely that in case of a conflict between that country and “Brussels”, the government of 
the country in question would agree to ESM action to the benefit of other member states.  
This is even true in the less extreme scenario when a large member state comes under pressure 
from markets without a political conflict with the rest of the Eurozone but simply because of 
policy mistakes: In this case, shoring up other member states would mean acknowledging that 
there is a problem that requires such drastic action. This is the last thing a government would be 
willing to publicly accept.   
Again, alleviating this problem would have meant amending ESM governance. At the very 
minimum, it would have required lowering the majority requirements under the emergency 
procedure. But the planned ESM reform does nothing of that sort and leaves it vulnerable to 
paralysis in one of the two central scenarios for which the ESM may next be required.  
3 Reason Three: Precautionary lending gets gutted 
The previous crisis has demonstrated the often heavy political price that governments have to 
pay when they enter a full-blown ESM programme. Naturally, this experience has further 
increased the incentive for governments to wait until the last minute to request financial 
assistance – an incentive structure that could make a programme unnecessarily costly for all 
sides. This is why when the ESM was created in 2012, the treaty already foresaw the possibility of 
extending precautionary credit lines to member states as long as they fulfilled certain ex-ante 
eligibility criteria.  
Currently, countries can request access to precautionary lending under the Precautionary 
Conditioned Credit Line as long as they fulfil their obligations under EU economic surveillance. 
This means that, even if a country is under an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) or an Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure (EIP), it may still ask for a precautionary credit line as long as it complies 
with the recommendations addressed to it under those procedures. In addition, there is the 
Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) for countries that do not fulfil the PCCL criteria. Under 
the ECCL, countries need to take active policy action, which brings this instrument very close to 
traditional adjustment programmes, just without actual money flowing. 
In practice, this possibility has not been used so far while IMF experience with precautionary 
credit lines has been mixed. Yet there are good arguments why having an intermediate facility 
short of a full programme could be beneficial for countries that find themselves under market 
pressure due to contagion from others. This is why France and Germany called in their Meseberg 
roadmap for making “existing precautionary instruments more effective”. And indeed, clarifying 
the rules for the precautionary credit lines could be useful to make their use more practical – in 
particular by making it clear that as long as a country plays by the Eurozone rules, it can access 
the PCCL without any further strings attached.  
The planned reform does nothing of that sort. For the PCCL, it symbolically abolishes the need 
for a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ESM and the member state and 
replaces it with a “Letter of Intent” (LoI) by the member state. Interestingly, this is exactly the  
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document the IMF already uses for all its programmes – and of course, LoIs in the IMF context 
are no less an outcome of negotiations than MoUs in the ESM context.  
The counterpart to this symbolic gesture is a significant hardening of the criteria for accessing 
the PCCL. Thus, the reform effectively kills the instrument. Now countries under Excessive 
Deficit Procedure will be excluded upfront. As a reminder, during the financial crisis all 
Eurozone countries except Luxembourg and Estonia were in the EDP – this as simply a 
consequence of the fact that EDP triggers are nominal and tend to flash during downturns. So, in 
a comparable situation, precautionary lending would now be out of reach for practically all 
Eurozone countries.  
But there is more: Countries will also need to meet quantitative benchmarks in the two years 
before requesting a precautionary credit line. This includes the debt benchmark, which requires 
a constant reduction of debt-to-GDP for countries whose ratio exceeds 60%. Even in only a mild 
downturn trying to further reduce the debt ratio does not make much sense from a 
macroeconomic perspective. That is why the fiscal rules give the Commission ample room to 
disregard breaches of the debt benchmark if that seems reasonable. Yet, for the purpose of 
precautionary lending, the December summit decision foresees no wiggle room whatsoever. This 
will further drastically reduce country eligibility as soon as the macroeconomic outlook becomes 
a shade cloudier.  
Finally, member states will not only have to meet these criteria when they apply for a 
precautionary credit line – they will have to keep meeting these criteria as long as they want to 
have access. This means that in a downturn in practice a country can choose between a fiscal 
response or the precautionary credit line; it will hardly be able to have both at the same time 
given the very restrictive nature of the eligibility criteria on the fiscal side.  
Precautionary lending is supposed to be an instrument that prevents vulnerable yet 
fundamentally still robust economies from contracting serious diseases. The reform will likely 
shut the door of the doctor’s practice on all those with as little as a runny nose, leaving the 
emergency room – a full ESM programme with all its stigma and political costs for the Eurozone 
at large – as the most viable option when it’s already too late.  
But it might not be too late for last-minute corrections prior to the June summit: It could for 
example still be clarified that the ECCL will be, without further strings attached, open to 
countries that comply with the economic governance rules but do not meet the PCCL criteria. 
These countries would then not need their policy and would not need to make further policy 
commitments in the Memorandum of Understanding as long as they comply with their 
EDP/MIP recommendations. However, this seems politically very unlikely at this stage. 
4 Reason Four: Treatment of unsustainable debt remains 
unclear 
With hindsight, a key lesson of the three successive Greek programmes is that the country’s debt 
is unsustainable – and in all probability has been unsustainable for a long time without any 
adequate instruments in the ESM toolbox to deal with it. In an ad-hoc procedure subject to much  
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litigation, Greece and its creditors agreed on a voluntary debt exchange in 2012. Last summer, 
Greece and the Eurogroup agreed additional debt measures.  
While these measures somewhat served their purpose, they have delivered very limited 
predictability to markets about what would happen in a similar situation in future. The ESM 
treaty itself also provides little orientation. It prescribes a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) as 
part of preparing every programme, but does not specify what happens if the DSA is negative. It 
also contains a recital that refers to “IMF practice” for private sector involvement in “exceptional 
cases” – but does not specify how this is connected to the DSA. This kind of uncertainty is 
certainly problematic if one desires greater market discipline – but it is also suboptimal if one 
chiefly wants to avoid market panic due to uncertainty.  
The ESM reform could have clarified the procedure. At the very minimum, it should be made 
clear that where debt is clearly unsustainable, bringing it back to sustainable levels should be a 
necessary part of the programme measures. But the planned reform does not contain such 
clarification. Instead, the term sheet “reaffirm[s] the principle that financial assistance should 
only be granted to countries whose debt is sustainable and whose repayment capacity is 
confirmed.” Interestingly, this principle was not contained in the ESM treaty before. In addition, 
all countries will now have to include so-called single-limb collective action clauses in their 
bonds to make restructuring easier and the ESM can “facilitate the dialogue between its 
Members and private investors.” 
In sum, the term sheet drops a number of hints that indeed restructuring should happen if debt 
is clearly unsustainable but then stops short of providing predictability as to what will actually 
happen next time the situation arises. 
5 Reason Five: ESM staff gets real tasks – but not the 
governance to fulfil them 
A major treaty change this reform will introduce is an increased role for the ESM as an 
organization (read here about the distinction between the ESM as a mechanism and as an 
organization). At the moment, ESM staff have only a very marginal formal role in the design and 
monitoring of programmes – the bulk of the responsibility lies with the European Commission 
and to a lesser extent with the ECB and the IMF. Member states have agreed in the term sheet to 
change this in line with a joint position by the ESM and the European Commission.  
Crucially, ESM staff will participate in the DSA. In case of conflict with the Commission, ESM 
staff will be tasked to determine the “repayment capacity” of a Member State when entering a 
programme. They will also contribute to the formulation of programme conditionality. This is 
manifestly different from what ESM staff have formally done so far. Crucially, the new tasks will 
require the ESM to have an institutional view on very sensitive issues such as determining the 
debt sustainability of a member state requiring a bail-out.  The question then is who decides on 
this institutional view. 
Unlike the Commission or the ECB, the ESM has no decision-making bodies of its own that 
would enjoy some degree of independence: Board of Governors and Board of Directors are fully  
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in the hand of member states, even more so because unanimity reigns. So giving a task “to the 
ESM” either means giving it directly to member states or giving it to the managing director 
(MD). And, arguably, the difference between the two is marginal as the MD directly reports to 
the member states. The MD has no independent source of legitimacy unlike the Commission that 
derives half of its own legitimacy from the EP. The MD has no safeguards for her independence 
unlike the ECB which enjoys the full force of the independence provisions of the EU treaties. 
Indeed, the Board of Governors can sack the MD by qualified majority at any point in time. 
Finally, the MD has no own formal channel of parliamentary accountability where she could get 
backing for her actions.   
None of this was a major issue as long as the ESM was a mere financing vehicle. The moment it 
has to take politically sensitive decisions, this seems no longer tenable: The judgments the 
Commission so far has taken in cooperation with the IMF and the ECB and will share in the 
future with the ESM are necessarily uncomfortable for some member states – that is why the 
programme work was delegated to the institutions formerly known as the Troika in the first 
place.  
For the ESM to be able to take such decisions without full-blown politicization but with some 
degree of independence would require its revamp : At a minimum, there should be some organ 
for collective decision-making at the helm  enjoying a degree of independence from member 
states akin to the ECB’s executive board. It should also be able to rely on a parliamentary 
accountability channel with the European Parliament. Otherwise the institution risks being 
crushed between member state’s interests to the extent of potential paralysis.  Just imagine state 
secretaries in the Board of Directors having to agree unanimously on DSA methodology! 
So far, however, the term sheet foresees no change to the governance of the ESM whatsoever: a 
huge gap that would need to, but will likely not, be filled.    
6 Conclusion 
ESM reform was never supposed to be a silver bullet – but the backstop discussion had opened a 
window of opportunity to make the Eurozone’s crisis management framework more stable and 
better equipped to deal with crises in the future. However, this chance was missed. The reform as 
it stands today will do very little on that front – and in particular when it comes to precautionary 
lending, it will make matters worse.  
Negotiations are still ongoing for the summit decision in June. Precisely in the area where the 
reform could do damage, on precautionary lending, it would be good if negotiators could have 
another look at the provisions and make improvements. Yet given that the term sheet is already 
extremely detailed, scope for this is limited. 
ESM reform will bring banking union closer to completion by adding the backstop. This is why 
despite all the criticism of the reform, it is important that it passes. But beyond this initial 
rationale for opening the ESM treaty, the opportunity for further strengthening ESM and EMU 
more broadly was missed.  
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Member states should now do three things: At the very least, they should make sure the reform 
passes and muster the political courage to ensure smooth ratification. Second, they should make 
improvements wherever possible in the areas outlined above. And third, they should not give the 
impression that this reform is the big leap forward that would allow for taking EMU reform off 
the political agenda in the coming years.   
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